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Krista Ratcliffe 
Rhetorical Listening: A Trope 
for Interpretive Invention 
and a "Code of Cross- 
Cultural Conduct" 
In the beginning was not the word. In the beginning is 
the hearing. 
-Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology 
My hearing depends on detailed differences or 
similarities.... And sometimes and in varying degrees, 
I can choose the mode of my conscious listening. 
-Alice Rayner, "The Audience" 
And once we have a vocabulary for explaining what 
we do when we listen, it is easier to convince others to 
listen the way we do-and to change the way we 
listen ourselves. 
-Peter Rabinowitz, "Fictional Music: 
Toward a Theory of Listening" 
Reading, writing, speaking, and listening 
were cornerstones of Western rhetorical 
studies for more than 2,000 years. But 
in the 20th century recovery of rhetoric within composition studies, read- 
ing and writing reign as the dominant tropes for interpretive invention;1 
speaking places a respectable third; listening runs a poor, poor fourth. 
Krista Ratcliffe is an associate professor of English at Marquette University in Milwaukee, WI. 
She teaches writing, rhetorical theory, and women's literature. Her scholarly work emerges at 
the intersections of rhetorical theory, feminist theory, and reading/writing pedagogy, as evi- 
denced by her book Anglo-American Feminist Challenges to the Rhetorical Tradition(s): Virginia 
Woolf Mary Daly, and Adrienne Rich and her articles in Rhetoric Review, Studies in the Literary Imag- 
ination, and The Writing Instructor. Her current book-length study explores how rhetoric and 
composition studies may recover listening in theory and praxis in ways that promote a femi- 
nist literacy-a literacy in which awareness of gender is complicated by other cultural catego- 
ries, such as "race" (including whiteness). The purpose of such literacy, she argues, is to 
facilitate cross-cultural dialogues in the classroom and beyond. 
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Indeed, listening has been neglected. That's not to say listening has never 
been mentioned within 20th-century scholarship. It has. For example, 
James Phelan and Andrea Lunsford employ listening to explore voices 
speaking or not speaking within written texts. Phelan posits listening as a 
means of constructing "some conceptual model for defining and investi- 
gating voice in written discourse," particularly narratives (132), and Lun- 
sford offers listening as a means for reclaiming "the voices of women in 
the history of rhetoric" (6), voices of women long dead who need no long- 
er be silent if only we know how to listen for them.2 Yet these scholars' fo- 
cus on voice elides sustained theorizing about listening. Victor Vitanza also 
employs listening not to discover individual voices but rather to play with/ 
in texts. By pondering Nietzschean, hermeneutic and poststructuralist 
conversations about listening and the ear, Vitanza promotes listening as a 
means of questioning the logos and exposing its "duplicity"/"triplicity"/ 
"complicity" within language (165-69). But despite the work of these 
prominent scholars, the dominant trend in our field has been to follow the 
lead of popular culture and naturalize listening-to assume it is something 
that everyone does but no one need study. The implication for composi- 
tion studies is quite simple: listening has almost ceased to be theorized or 
taught as a rhetorical strategy. 
For some time I have been wondering how listening may be recovered 
so as to inform our field theoretically and pedagogically. In this article, I 
want to suggest that rhetorical listening may be imagined, generally, as a 
trope for interpretive invention, one on equal footing with the tropes of 
reading and writing and speaking. Although rhetorical listening may be 
employed to hear discursive intersections of any cultural categories (age 
and class, nationality and history, religion and politics) and any cultural 
positions (child and parent, patient and doctor, clergy and parishioner, 
teacher and student) (see Pradl 67-72), my particular interest lies in how 
it may help us to hear discursive intersections of gender and race/ethnicity' 
(including whiteness) so as to help us to facilitate cross-cultural dialogues 
about any topic. Thus, I want to suggest that rhetorical listening may be 
imagined, specifically, as what Jacqueline Jones Royster has called a "code 
of cross-cultural conduct."4 
My purpose in offering this definition and this particular focus is not to 
construct a totalizing definition of listening; such an endeavor is impossi- 
ble. Rather, my purpose is to invite further conversations on how listening 
may inform composition studies. To that end, I make the following moves 
in this article: (1) I briefly trace how rhetorical listening emerged in my 
thinking; (2) I explore disciplinary and cultural biases that subordinate lis- 
tening to reading and writing and speaking; (3) I speculate why listening is 
needed; (4) I offer an extended definition of rhetorical listening as a trope 
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for interpretive invention; (5) I demonstrate how it may be employed as a 
code of cross-cultural conduct; and (6) I listen to a student's listening. 
The Emergence of Rhetorical Listening, or How I Started to Hear 
My thinking about listening and its potential applications has emerged not 
just from an abstract, scholarly interest in the intersections of rhetorical 
theory and feminist theory but from several intertwining threads in my 
academic and personal lives. Two related threads demonstrate the difficul- 
ty of and the need for listening, particularly when intersections of gender 
and ethnicity intrude on cross-cultural conversations. The first thread 
emerged when I presented a paper about Mary Daly at a Womanist Spiri- 
tuality Conference in Columbia, Missouri. An African American woman in 
the audience told me afterwards that she refuses to read Daly because Da- 
ly's critique of women in patriarchy is really just a critique of white wom- 
en in patriarchy, one that excluded this audience member by erasing 
differences among women, a charge much like the one levelled against Daly 
by Audre Lorde ("An Open Letter" 70). The second thread emerged when 
I taught a special topics course called "The Rhetorics of Women's Autobi- 
ographies." A young white woman in class said that, although she was ex- 
tremely moved when reading excerpts from Audre Lorde's cancer 
journals, she didn't want to read any more of Lorde's writings. When I 
asked her why, she cited Lorde's last line: "If one Black woman I do not 
know gains hope and strength from my story, then it has been worth the 
difficulty of telling" (A Burst of Light 295). The student felt that Lorde, by 
specifying "Black woman," was excluding her by erasing commonalities 
among women. 
While I understand each woman's decision and recognize the power dif- 
ferentials of each situation, I find these threads troubling. Not only do they 
expose each woman's difficulty in imagining simultaneous differences and 
commonalities, they also resonate as metonymic echoes of larger cultural 
discourses repeated not just by other students but by people all across our 
country. What troubles me is that such reactions negate the possibility for 
cross-cultural dialogue not just about gender and ethnicity but about any 
subject. Although I certainly respect an individual's right to refrain from di- 
alogue at a particular moment in her or his life, I do not accept our culture's 
dearth of discursive possibilities either for articulating intersections of gen- 
der and ethnicity or for promoting cross-cultural dialogues. 
Listening, it seems to me, might serve as one such possibility. But listen- 
ing is hardly a simple solution; indeed, it raises many questions: Why is it 
so hard to listen to one another? Why is it so hard to resist a guilt/blame 
logic when we do listen? Why is it so hard to identify with one another 
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when we feel excluded? Why is it so hard to focus simultaneously on com- 
monalities and differences among ourselves? And how do the power dif- 
ferentials of our particular standpoints influence our ability to listen? Any 
definition of listening must account for these questions. 
A third thread complicates the first two by exposing an all-too-often 
missing component in gender/ethnicity discussions and in cross-cultural 
discussions of any topic. That missing component is whiteness. While writ- 
ing my book about Anglo-American feminist theories of rhetoric, I was 
challenged by Susan Jarratt to consider how race informed gender in the 
texts of Virginia Woolf, Mary Daly, and Adrienne Rich. So I considered two 
issues: one, the attitude that these women's texts expressed and represent- 
ed about race/ethnicity and, two, the influence that whiteness played on 
their texts. Yet when I completed the project, I was left with more ques- 
tion than conclusions. I wondered: What exactly is whiteness? How does 
it function rhetorically, especially in relation with gender? And for whom 
is whiteness (in)visible? And personally, I also wondered: How does my 
life as a white woman affect my actions as a teacher at Marquette Univer- 
sity, as a scholar in composition studies, as a mother who shops at Piggly 
Wiggly in Cedarburg, WI, after work? What lessons am I (un)consciously 
sending to my students, my readers, my neighbors, my daughter, myself? 
A fourth thread provides language-a category-with which to con- 
template one specific application of listening: articulating intersections of 
gender and ethnicity to promote cross-cultural communication. When 
Jacqueline Jones Royster gave her opening keynote address at the 1997 
Feminisms and Rhetorics conference in Corvalis, OR, she challenged us all 
to construct "codes of cross-cultural conduct," rhetorical strategies for fos- 
tering cross-cultural communication. Royster's challenge resonated with 
me. Suddenly I saw an opening for my interest in rhetorical theory (the 
absence of listening) to merge with my interest in feminist theory (the in- 
tersections of gender and ethnicity) as a means of doing my own gender/ 
race work, both professionally and personally.5 By weaving the above 
threads together, I have created a place from which to ponder listening, or 
rather what I have come to think of as rhetorical listening. 
Why Neglect? or How Disciplinary and Cultural Biases 
Displace Listening 
One disciplinary bias that explains our field's neglect of listening may be 
found, most obviously, in the work we do: we have appropriated Western 
rhetorical theories to theorize writing and the teaching of writing. Because 
we focus primarily on written discourse and because listening is common- 
ly associated with oral discourse, we have been slow to imagine how lis- 
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tening might inform our discipline. We have more readily paired writing 
with reading and, to a lesser extent, with speaking. We pair writing with 
reading because many teachers assume that improving students' reading 
skills improves their writing skills. And although speaking is not our field's 
primary province, we also pair it with writing. It haunts our theories and 
praxis either as an invention strategy (students' talking with peers in re- 
view sessions and with teachers in conferences), a proofreading strategy 
(students' reading papers aloud to check sentence flow), or as an influen- 
tial metaphor (voice). As a result of these pairings, our field's dominant 
tropes for interpretive invention have been writing and reading and 
speaking. I am inviting us to consider rhetorical listening as another effec- 
tive trope for interpretive invention. 
A second disciplinary bias that explains our neglect of listening is that 
Western rhetorical theories themselves have traditionally slighted listening. 
Classical theories foreground the rhetor's speaking and writing as means of 
persuading audiences; these theories are only secondarily concerned with 
how audiences should listen and hardly at all concerned with what 
Michelle Ballif calls the desires of particular audience members. Granted, 
Aristotle's Rhetoric assures students who study his rhetorical theory that 
they will learn not only how to produce nthymemes but also how to analyze 
them (I. 12), and in a culture whose texts were primarily oral, such analysis 
implies listening. But Aristotle's theory never delves into how to listen. 
Moreover, his production/reception linkage is more complicated than his 
assurance allows. Although most writing teachers and students link produc- 
tion (writing) with reception (reading), they also recognize differences- 
most students are more comfortable with reading than with writing. And 
although writing teachers and students may link strategies of production 
(speaking with writing) and strategies of reception (reading with listening), 
they ascertain differences here too: speaking is second "nature" for most 
students, but writing is not; some students learn better by reading informa- 
tion, others by hearing it explained. Yet classical and modern theories of 
rhetoric rarely delineate or question such production/reception differences. 
Although poststructuralist theory calls such differences into question, it 
inadvertently serves as a third disciplinary bias in our field's neglect of 
listening. Jacques Derrida's project to deconstruct Western metaphysics 
reverses Plato's celebration of speaking and suspicion of writing. Conse- 
quently, deconstruction champions writing as a trope that more accurately 
describes how we use language and how language uses us; moreover, it 
collapses reading into this equation by arguing that writing is reading is 
writing. But because it denigrates speaking as the trope that fosters a 
metaphysics of presence, poststructuralist theory in the wake of Derrida 
finds itself suspicious of speaking and, by association, of listening, even 
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though Derrida pays tribute to listening as a means of substituting the eth- 
ical for the ideal in his essay about Emmanuel Levinas (Derrida 99). 
One cultural bias that may partially account for our field's neglect of lis- 
tening is exposed in the work of Deborah Tannen. Citing personal obser- 
vation, other researchers' case studies, and her own linguistic theory, 
Tannen claims that in our culture speaking is gendered as masculine and 
valued positively in a public forum while listening is gendered as feminine 
and valued negatively. Tannen further argues that our culture socializes 
men and women to listen differently: men often listen by challenging 
speakers to a verbal duel to determine who knows more and who is quick- 
er on his feet; women often listen by smiling, nodding, asking questions 
and providing encouraging verbal cues (yes, uh huh, is that right?, hmmm) 
(142). In other words, men are socialized to play the listening game via the 
questions "'Have I won?'" and "'Do you respect me?'" while women are 
socialized to play it via the questions "'Have I been helpful?'" and "'Do 
you like me?'" (129). Thus gendered, listening subordinates not only 
women to men but listening to speaking. 
Another cultural bias that may inform our neglect of listening emerges 
in the writings of Nikki Giovanni, who argues that listening is not only 
gendered but informed by ethnicity. Specifically, Giovanni argues that lis- 
tening is not as necessary in our culture for white people as it is for people 
of color; she also argues that this general trend can be complicated by class 
differences. To illustrate her point, Giovanni imagines a fictional scenario, 
a poet's internal dialogue with herself while composing a talk for the 
372nd Annual Convention of Black and White Women in America: 
I suppose we shouldn't even talk about how the women's movement 
wouldn't listen to the Black women when we tried to say that the average 
white woman didn't understand her maid. I mean, [in the movie An Imita- 
tion of Life] when Lana Turner said to Annie, "I didn't know you belonged to 
a lodge," Juanita Moore replied, "Well, Miss Laura [sic], you never asked." 
There was no women's movement; there was a white women's movement 
and Black women never were, nor felt, included. It's all been an imitation of 
life to us, and the long walk home won't change that. (85-86) 
Giovanni points out that Lana Turner's Lora Meredith wears the blinders 
that privilege affords privileged people, in this case the blinders that white 
privilege affords white people. Despite the fact that Annie is privy to the 
intimate details of Lora's life, Lora has not imagined her maid's life, Annie 
Johnson's life, beyond the services visibly rendered in their apartment. 
One question that may be asked of this scenario is: how may Lora change 
her complicity in the structural and personal racism that haunts all their 
lives if she cannot see it? 
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This question exposes a third cultural bias that may have influenced 
our field's neglect of listening-our culture's privileging of sight, our pref- 
erence for interpretive tropes that proceed via the eye, what Martin Jay 
calls ocularcentrism.6 The question that emerges is: what are the limits of 
ocularcentrism? As any camera operator will confirm, the limitation of 
sight is that when one object is foregrounded, other objects blur, fade into 
the background, fall outside the field of vision. To carry this metaphor fur- 
ther, I believe that the sight tropes of reading and writing may sometimes 
perpetuate our difficulty of bringing into focus two differences, such as 
gender and ethnicity. Adrienne Rich admits the difficulty of such a move, 
even as she exhorts us to "watch the edges that blur" ("Contradictions" 29): 
Sometimes I feel I have seen too long from too many disconnected angles: 
white, Jewish, anti-Semite, racist, anti-racist, once-married lesbian, middle- 
class, feminist, exmatriate southerner, split at the root-that I will never 
bring them whole. 
I would have liked, in this essay, to bring together the meanings of anti- 
Semitism and racism as I have experienced them and as I believe they inter- 
sect in the world beyond my life. But I'm not able to do this yet. ("Split at the 
Root" 122). 
This difficulty is exemplified in Lora and Annie's situation: Lora does not 
understand Annie because the cultural "blinders" of white and class privi- 
lege impede Lora's ability to "visualize" Annie's life beyond how it "visi- 
bly" intersects with her own. And I believe this difficulty, in one way or 
another, haunts all our lives. Despite this difficulty, Rich admonishes us to 
keep trying to understand by bringing blurred intersections together and 
then acting accordingly: "we can't wait to speak until we are perfectly 
clear and righteous. There is no purity and, in our lifetime, no end to this 
process" (123). So for those times when we run into difficulty with blurred 
intersections, I suggest we switch from a sight trope to an auditory one 
and see, or rather listen to, where it may lead. 
Why Listening? or What the Ear Has to Offer 
Before offering an extended definition of rhetorical listening, I feel com- 
pelled to carve out a space for listening. For of all the questions that have 
haunted this project, one keeps coming back to me from reviewers and 
audience members: How does listening differ from reading? When I pre- 
sented a version of this article at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's 
Rhetoric and Composition Lecture Series, a graduate student responded, 
prefacing her remarks with, "Of course, what you're really talking about is 
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a kind of reading." No, I tried to explain, I am not. I am talking about in- 
terpretive invention, a way of making meaning with/in language, with 
two different kinds being reading and listening. For if listening is to be re- 
vived and revalued in our field, it must occupy its own niche. Rather than 
be subsumed by reading, it should rank as an equal yet intertwining pro- 
cess of interpretive invention, for sometimes the ear can help us see just as 
the eye can help us hear.7 But I am not surprised at the graduate student's 
response. It is informed not only by the disciplinary and cultural biases 
previously mentioned but also by what I believe is the organizing principle 
of these biases: the divided logos that Martin Heidegger claims we have in- 
herited in the west, the logos that speaks but does not listen. 
One need not fully subscribe to Heidegger's philosophical project of 
dasein, or being in the world, to recognize the aptness of his divided logos 
theory. In general, the logos is a system of discourse within which a cul- 
ture reasons and derives its truths. Although the Greeks had different 
concepts of logos (Jarratt 42-61), Heidegger argues that these concepts 
imply both speaking and listening. He further argues that "this nature of 
language remains hidden from the Greeks. They have never expressedly 
stressed it, much less raised it to the level of a problem. But their state- 
ments operate in this realm" (What 202). To explain his claim, Heidegger 
explores the relationship between the Greek noun logos and its verb form 
legein, which in its fullest sense means both "saying" and "laying" (198). 
The second meaning, "laying," entails laying others' ideas in front of us in 
order to let these ideas lie before us. This laying-to-let-lie-before-us func- 
tions as a preservation of others' ideas (194-215) and, hence, as a site for 
listening. 
But because we have inherited a divided logos, we inhabit a culture 
where "saying" has assumed dominance and "laying" (and, thus, listen- 
ing) has been displaced. Thus separated from a consideration of otherness, 
"saying" quickly becomes masterly expression; writing, a means of master- 
ly expression; and reading, a means of mastering-the-masterly-expression. 
And all three quickly subsume listening. But listening is not totally erased, 
just displaced...and almost always diminished from its potential as legein. 
Sometimes it is acknowledged because it cannot be physically ignored, as 
in the fields of psychology, theology, and communications. Sometimes it is 
assumed to be a natural process that we need not study, as in composition 
studies. Sometimes it is mistaken for silence, as in patriarchal histories of 
women and non-dominant ethnic groups. And sometimes it goes by an- 
other name: reading, as when we read for tone, rhythm, voice, silence and 
a plethora of other elements associated with a h(ear)ring metaphor.8 
In The Other Side of Language: A Philosophy of Listening, Gemma Corradi 
Fiumara calls for both a reinterpretation of our logos to expose its divided 
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nature and a restoration of a fuller logos based on the Greek action legein 
(11-17). Such reinterpretations and restorations would result in a philos- 
ophy of listening, which would offer us other codes for conducting our- 
selves in the world. For as Fiumara suggests, a philosophy of listening "is 
an attempt to retrieve the functions of listening which may allow for truer 
forms of dialogue" (13). That is, in a divided logos (one that speaks but does 
not listen), we commonly employ dialogue as Hegelian dialectic wherein 
the posited thesis subsumes the acceptable aspects of the antithesis with 
the unacceptable excess being exiled from the dominant logic. In an undi- 
vided logos(one that speaks and listens), we would employ dialogue as a 
dialectic-that-questions-dialectic, enabling a metonymic coexistence of 
ideas (Fiumara 15, 17). 
Thus, I would like to echo Fiumara's call for listening by issuing a simi- 
lar one in composition studies. For just as all texts can be read, so too can 
all texts be listened to. As a trope for interpretive invention, rhetorical lis- 
tening differs from reading in that it proceeds via different body organs, 
different disciplinary and cultural assumptions, and different figures of 
speech. And as Fiumara suggests, listening maps out an entirely different 
space in which to relate to discourse: we may become "apprentices of lis- 
tening rather than masters of discourse" (57). For when listening within 
an undivided logos, we do not read simply for what we can agree with or 
challenge, as is the habit of academic reading (in its multiple guises). In- 
stead, we choose to listen also for the exiled excess and contemplate its re- 
lation to our culture and our selves. Such listening does not presume a 
naive, relativistic empathy, such as "I'm OK, You're OK," but rather an eth- 
ical responsibility to argue for what we deem fair and just while simulta- 
neously questioning that which we deem fair and just. Such listening, I 
argue, may help us invent, interpret, and ultimately judge differently in 
that perhaps we can hear things we cannot see. In this more inclusive logos 
lies a potential for personal and social justice. 
Hence, rhetorical listening as a trope for interpretive invention has the 
potential to function productively as a code of cross-cultural conduct. 
Perhaps through listening we can avail ourselves with more possibilities 
for inventing arguments that bring differences together, for hearing dif- 
ferences as harmony or even as discordant notes (in which case, at least, 
differences are discernible). Admittedly, we cannot hear everything at 
once (the din would no doubt madden us), yet we can listen to the har- 
mony and/or discordant notes, knowing that more than meets the eye 
lies before us. 
Obviously I am not arguing that we abandon reading, writing, and 
speaking. I am, however, suggesting that we recognize their limits and re- 
think them within an undivided logos, one that includes listening. 
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Rhetorical Listening as a Trope for Interpretive Invention, 
or How to "Break the Back of Words" 
An example of rhetorical listening emerges in Marge Piercy's poem, "The 
Book of Ruth and Naomi." Even though Ruth and Naomi are born into 
different ethnic groups (Ruth is Moabite; Naomi, Judean),9 they forge a 
relationship that, for centuries, has represented an ideal friendship be- 
tween women. Piercy attributes the success of their relationship, in part, 
to each woman's desire to whisper: 
Show me a woman who does not dream 
a double, heart's twin, a sister 
of the mind in whose ear she can whisper. (277) 
Yet this desire to whisper is predicated on the already existing possibility of 
another woman, one whose ear may hear the whisper, one who 
listens...and understands. Yet despite the fact that listening is a necessary 
component of these women's relationship, listening is backgrounded in 
this poem, in its Biblical source, in much of our cultural consciousness 
and, as I have already argued, in composition studies. 
To foreground listening in our field, I offer rhetorical listening as a trope 
for interpretive invention, one that emerges from a space within the logos 
where listeners may employ their agency-which Stanford drama theorist 
Alice Rayner defines as both "capacity" and willingness (7)-to situate 
themselves openly in relation to all kinds of discourse, whether written, 
oral, or imagistic. The rhetorical listening that I am promoting is a perfor- 
mance that occurs when listeners invoke both their capacity and their will- 
ingness (1) to promote an understanding of self and other that informs our 
culture's politics and ethics, (2) to proceed from within a responsibility logic, 
not from within a defensive guilt/blame one, (3) to locate identification in 
discursive spaces of both commonalities and differences, and (4) to accentuate 
commonalities and differences not only in claims but in cultural logics within 
which those claims function. As such, rhetorical listening enables us to 
hear textual strategies associated with a h(ear)ing metaphor, such as voice 
and silence; relatedly but more encompassingly, it enables us to hear what 
Toni Morrison calls "the sound that [breaks] the back of words" (Beloved 
261), thus enabling us to question the logos as we know it. What follows is 
an explanation of the above definition, an explanation indebted to Phelan 
and Lunsford, to Vitanza and Heidegger, and to Rayner and Morrison. 
By employing understanding as an end of rhetorical listening, I recognize 
that I am invoking a troubled term. Understanding has a complicated histo- 
ry in narrative studies and in philosophical studies in that it is often cou- 
pled with authorial intent.10 And as many scholars caution, this coupling 
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often gives birth to a naive idealism. For example, Julia Kristeva claims 
that because Westerners "are entitled only to the ear of the virginal body 
[of Mary]...., there arises a possible tendency to eroticize [and, hence, ide- 
alize] hearing, voice or even understanding" (173). And Steven Mailloux 
claims that coupling understanding and intent often circles "back to all the 
problems of textual realism and readerly idealism and ignores the specific 
rhetorical contexts of power-knowledge" (148). By posing understanding 
as an end of rhetorical listening, I am not proposing that we idealize un- 
derstanding or authorial intent: my purpose is neither to promote a "tex- 
tual realism" wherein a text is perceived as a repository of the truth nor to 
celebrate a naive "readerly idealism" wherein the contexts of speaker/ 
writers are simplified and the contexts of reader/listeners erased. Rather, 
my purpose is to wed Giovanni's real to Piercy's ideal, to collapse the real/ 
ideal dichotomy into a third ground where rhetorical negotiation is ex- 
posed as always already existing and where rhetorical listening is posited 
as one means of that negotiation. 
Granted, such a purpose resonates with remnants of idealism. But I like 
to consider them strategic. Just as Gayatri Spivak justifies subalterns' em- 
ploying a "strategic essentialism" in their critique of post-colonial oppres- 
sion (205), and just as Amy Schuman justifies ethnographers' employing a 
"strategic Romanticism" when constructing and analyzing the subjects of 
their studies, I am advocating a strategic idealism when listening with the 
intent to understand. Strategic idealism implies a conscious identification 
among people that is based on a desire for an intersubjective receptivity, 
not mastery, and on a simultaneous recognition of similarities and differ- 
ences, not merely one or the other. The idealism is strategic in that we 
should recognize the difficulty and dangers inherent in such a project... 
and proceed knowingly. 
As I employ it, then, understanding means more than simply listening for 
a speaker/writer's intent. It also means more than simply listening for our 
own self-interested intent, which may range from appropriation (employing 
a text for one's own ends), to Burkean identification (smoothing over differ- 
ences), to agreement (only affirming one's own view of reality). Instead, un- 
derstanding means listening to discourse not for intent but with intent-with 
the intent to understand not just the claims, not just the cultural logics 
within which the claims function, but the rhetorical negotiations of un- 
derstanding as well. To clarify this process of understanding, we might best 
invert the term and define understanding as standing under-consciously 
standing under discourses that surround us and others, while consciously 
acknowledging all our particular and fluid standpoints. Standing under 
discourses means letting discourses wash over, through, and around us 
and then letting them lie there to inform our politics and ethics. 
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Standing under our own discourses means identifying the various dis- 
courses embodied in each of us and then listening to hear and imagine 
how they might affect not only ourselves but others. The question that 
arises, of course, is the same dilemma that haunts Lora Meredith: How can 
we know what is so naturalized for us that it is no longer visible to us? As 
one answer to that question, at least in terms of theater performances, Al- 
ice Rayner offers listening. In many ways, her claim echoes Hans-Georg 
Gadamer's belief that "the primacy of hearing is the basis of the herme- 
neutical phenomenon" (420): that is, we speak because someone is listen- 
ing. If we pull Rayner's theory into composition studies, we may argue 
that those of us listening to our own discourses return our discourses to 
ourselves somehow unchanged but changed. To exemplify this process, 
Rayner points to Virginia Woolf, who writes of a longing to hear the echo 
of her own words. Rayner deems Woolf's desire as 
the need for a return (echo) of speech and gesture, a return that occurs in 
time as openness, not in a static image or closed meaning. The echo is life- 
giving because while it is rooted in the past, it is not fixed by the past. It re- 
turns the voice to the speaker, the same but different. (21). 
Because our returning discourses may look the same but resonate differ- 
ently, we need to cultivate both our eyes and our ears. 
Standing under the discourses of others means first acknowledging the 
existence of these discourses; second, listening for the (un)conscious pres- 
ences, absences, unknowns; and third, consciously integrating this infor- 
mation into our world-views and decision-making. The question that 
arises here is: how may we listen for that which we do not intellectually, 
viscerally, or experientially know? Or as Pocahontas sings to John Smith 
in that travesty of a Disney movie, how will you "learn things you never 
knew you never knew?" Again Rayner provides a way of thinking about 
this issue that may be borrowed for composition, a way of thinking that 
heeds Heidegger's reminder that in addition to silence, hearing is also a 
possibility of discursive speech ("Phenomenology" 234). Rayner argues 
that a theater audience (not as a collective whole but as a collection of in- 
dividuals) should listen to a performance, perceiving it "not as a referential 
intention but as a desire to be heard as meaningful or as meaningfully 
breaking the conventional frames. The emphasis...is on the attempt and 
effort, not success or failure" (18), at least not as defined by dominant so- 
cial conventions. This "desire to be heard" echoes not simply as a con- 
scious use of a discourse but also as all the unconscious, socializing 
functions of a discourse. If we meet this "desire to be heard" with counter- 
desires-pretending the desire to be heard does not exist, hoping it will 
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disappear, or waiting for someone else to handle it-we stymie potential 
dialogue. But by standing under the discourses of others and rhetorically 
listening to them, we may transpose a desire for mastery into a self-con- 
scious desire for receptivity; this process both invites the desires of others 
into our consciousness and accords these desires a place in which to be 
heard (Rayner 18). 
Standing under discourses does not guarantee agreement; it should not 
guarantee idealization; it does, however, offer the possibility of hearing 
what we cannot see. In this process the unknown becomes not a perpetu- 
ally purloined letter-"an irretrievable absence or gap which symbols re- 
place and displace, as in the Lacanian formula," but rather and "more 
simply and more radically a limit to understanding" (Rayner 14). Limits 
may be moved and re/moved. According to Rayner, the agency for moving 
and re/moving such limits involves a "capacity" and a willingness (7): lis- 
teners possess that capacity and what we must supply is the willingness. 
This focus on willingness, on conscious action, on listening does not deny 
the socializing power of discourse on people's unconscious. Rather, it sim- 
ply articulates the space within which we may interject our own agencies, 
albeit partial and complicated, into our own socializations. 
The goal of understanding is a broader cultural literacy within which 
we may negotiate our daily attitudes and actions, our politics and our eth- 
ics. Rayner provides theater-goers with a definition of one such literacy, a 
definition that might be applied more generally to composition studies via 
rhetorical listening: 
It is perhaps a borderland more than a boundary between the capacity to 
hear and the obligation to listen to what one cannot immediately understand 
or comprehend. And it leads to the learning of community...in the exchange 
of signs.... At the very least, such choice involves a decision to recognize and 
become self-conscious toward the limitations of [one's] own 'imaginary' ver- 
sion of self and other-a limitation that does not acquiesce to...an unknow- 
able, but takes that unknowable as a pre-condition within which action is 
still necessary and a confrontation with another inevitable. (18-19) 
Even if-and perhaps because-confrontation is inevitable, this literacy 
has the potential to effect more productive discourses about, and across, 
differences and commonalities. Acquiring such literacy is both a political 
and ethical issue for people wielding power and for people lacking it. 
Positing political action as another end of rhetorical listening fore- 
grounds the realm where rhetoric intersects ethics. This connection may 
be easily discerned but not so easily acted upon. That is, we may not al- 
ways choose or control the discourses that socialize us; neither may we 
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choose or control our unconscious responses to them. But once we con- 
sciously articulate our socializations and choose to respond to them, we 
become responsible for our words, our attitudes, our actions. And because 
it is through words, attitudes, and actions that we negotiate our conven- 
tional truths as well as our behaviors based upon these truths, Diane Davis 
argues that: 
What is needed now is an ethics of decision; to the extent that we may no 
longer simply be guided by ontological Truth, by light or logos, decisions have 
to be made. And any ethics of decision necessitates first a "hearing"-double 
entendre intended: it necessitates both a listening and a judging. 
Rayner agrees, claiming that listening as presence and as judgment pre- 
sumes "an ethics of relation not simply power over" (21). That difference 
is the mediation of discourse through the listener, whether other or self- 
as-other. In this way, the other becomes a necessary consideration in the 
making of meaning for both the speaker/writer and the listener." Thus, 
rhetorical listening opens up not only possibilities, but responsibilities, for 
interpretive invention, for making meanings via language via others. Al- 
though rhetorical listening does not guarantee that everyone will concur 
about definitions, intersections, and applications of the political and the 
ethical, it does guarantee that such considerations will be at the forefront 
of meaning-making. 
By championing a responsibility logic, not a guilt/blame one, rhetorical 
listening offers us the possibility of getting past the guilt/blame tropes of 
accusation, denial, and defensiveness-all of which are associated with au- 
thorial intent and all of which usually result in a stalemate that preserves 
the status quo. By championing a responsibility logic, rhetorical listening 
asks us, first, to judge not simply the person's intent but the historically sit- 
uated discourses that are (un)consciously swirling around and through the 
person and, second, to evaluate politically and ethically how these dis- 
courses function and how we want to act upon them. 
By locating identification in discursive spaces of commonalities and dif- 
ferences, rhetorical listening juxtaposes traditional and postmodern rhe- 
torical concerns. Traditional theories of rhetoric celebrate commonality, a 
metaphoric common ground, a Burkean sharing of substance, as the place 
of identification and, hence, of persuasion (Rhetoric 55). Postmodern theo- 
ries of discourse question the possibility of substance and common ground 
and, instead, champion a metonymic juxtaposition of differences as the 
place of identification (Fuss 3; Butler 93-121). The problem with tradi- 
tional identification is that differences are often glossed over or erased, left 
outside the circle of consubstantiality; the problem with postmodern iden- 
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tification is that commonalities are often perceived as impossible or as im- 
possibly naive. Rhetorical listening interrupts this binary opposition by 
positing both commonalities and differences as possible metonymic places 
for rhetorical exchanges. In these places, discourses (not substances) con- 
verge and diverge. In these places, dialogue emerges as a dialectical con- 
versation that questions the process of dialectic, a conversation that "seeks 
not the clarification and rigidification of difference [or commonalities] but 
rather the murky margins between, those margins of overlap which inau- 
gurate and which limit the very functioning of dialectic" (Williams 218). 
Within such borderlands, rhetorical listening helps us to analyze such con- 
vergences and divergences. This analysis, in turn, helps us to articulate our 
socialization and also to communicate about-and across-both differenc- 
es and commonalities. 
By focusing on the differences and commonalities within textual claims 
and their cultural logics, rhetorical listening ties the personal (the claim) to 
the political (the cultural logic) without totally collapsing differences be- 
tween the two. Although both claims and cultural logics are rhetorical con- 
structs, our arguments and our analyses of arguments too often focus only 
on claims: "I'm right." vs. "No, you're not." If we recognize not just the 
claims but the historically-grounded cultural logics enveloping other peo- 
ple's claims, we may still disagree with the claims, but we may better un- 
derstand the personal and cultural assumptions (dare I say, values and 
beliefs) that guide other people's logics. And if we also recognize how 
claims and cultural logics are rhetorically constructed, we may better ap- 
preciate the reasoning powers of others even when we disagree with them. 
While there are obvious benefits of rhetorical listening, there are also 
caveats. First, listening with the intent to receive, not master, discourses is 
not a quick fix or a happy-ever-after solution; rather, it is an on-going pro- 
cess. It will not result in an ideal world in which listening, or rhetorical ne- 
gotiation, is no longer necessary. Such hopes are not only naive but 
dangerous. Instead rhetorical listening is another way of helping us con- 
tinually negotiate our always evolving standpoints, our identities, with the 
always evolving standpoints of others. It is also another way of helping us 
recognize that our standpoints are not autonomous points of static stases 
but rather complex webs of dynamically intermingled cultural structures 
and subjective agency. 
Second, although listening with the intent to receive, not master, dis- 
courses can motivate a particular listener to take political/ethical action, 
this listener's desire cannot control how other readers, writers, speakers, 
and listeners will, in turn, receive her desire, her discourse, her actions. 
One should certainly not expect a pat on the back either for rhetorical lis- 
tening or for speaking, reading, or writing based on rhetorical listening. 
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After all, rhetorical listening is the responsibility of everyone. Expectations 
to the contrary are not only insulting but reduce rhetorical listening to 
simple intent. 
And third, as Marquette undergraduate Sara Scheunemann articulates: 
"Listening with the intent to understand opens [us] up...to being chal- 
lenged, convicted, and hurt by the truth." It may be more another's truth 
than the truth that hurts us; however, this challenge, this conviction, this 
hurt exposes a space of dissonance. When responding to this dissonance, 
we should not accuse the person foregrounding it, deny its existence, nor 
bristle defensively. Such reactions only shut down dialogue and reinforce 
the status quo. Rather, we should question ourselves-our attitudes and 
our actions-to determine whether we need to affirm, revise, or reject 
them. If such questioning makes us more uncomfortable, so be it. In fact, 
good. Such discomfort simply signifies already existing problems and un- 
derscores the need for standing under the discourses of ourselves and 
others-and listening. 
One Use, or Rhetorical Listening as a Code of Cross-Cultural Conduct 
If rhetorical listening functions, generally, as a trope for interpretive in- 
vention, it may also be specifically employed in innumerable ways. But, 
again, I am most interested in its potential as "a code of cross-cultural con- 
duct." Its potential lies in the fact that listening not only signifies respect 
but also asks listeners to acknowledge, to cultivate, and to negotiate con- 
ventions of different discourse communities. As a code of cross-cultural 
conduct, rhetorical listening may further our understanding of gender and 
ethnicity intersections in ways that may promote cross-cultural dialogues 
on any number of topics. 
To exemplify why our articulations of gender and ethnicity intersec- 
tions must include whiteness, let me revisit a thread in my thinking about 
rhetorical listening. When I mentioned earlier that Susan Jarratt chal- 
lenged me to consider how race complicated my book project on Anglo- 
American feminist theories of rhetoric, what I did not tell you was this: 
Writing about Woolf's, Daly's, and Rich's race/ethnicity claims was fairly 
easy, but writing about how whiteness hovers around these women's dis- 
cussions of women, language, and culture was hard. 
What complicated my musing at that moment was my own standpoint 
as a white feminist who had an abhorrence of racism and who had consid- 
ered how racism works in the lives of people of color but who had never 
really been taught, nor had taken it upon herself to learn, how racism 
functions in relation to whiteness and/or white people. Jarratt's challenge 
to acknowledge race in my book project afforded me such an opportunity. 
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But when I began thinking about whiteness, I found myself echoing the 
claims of Adrienne Rich ("Split" 122), Ruth Frankenberg ("When We Are 
Capable" 11), and Becky Thompson ("Time Traveling" 95): Nothing in my 
education, academic or otherwise, had prepared me to recognize (see) or 
articulate (say) whiteness in myself or others, and certainly nothing in my 
education had provided me with strategies for resisting certain versions of 
my whiteness that may privilege me but not others. 
So I decided to find strategies for conceptualizing and articulating white- 
ness. I reasoned that if I could not see the way whiteness worked, perhaps I 
could hear it. Thus, I came to link rhetorical listening with articulating gen- 
der and ethnicity concerns, particularly gendered constructions of white- 
ness. The question that emerged next, of course, was: What should I listen 
to? Given my thinking about rhetorical listening, the obvious answer was: 
to the discourses of myself and others. For my purposes, I settled on three 
types: autoethnography, academic research, and the stories of others. 
My interest in listening to autoethnography'2 initially emerged from a 
fascinating discussion that suddenly erupted a few years ago in my under- 
graduate rhetorical theory class. In response to Cornel West's Race Matters, 
an exasperated white student told the class, "I don't see what the big deal 
is. I don't wake up every morning, look in the mirror, and say, 'Hey, I'm a 
white man.'" I paused for a moment, letting the tension in the room build, 
and then I asked him, "Do you think that is West's point? That you don't 
have to think about race but he does?" What followed was the longest si- 
lence and then the most lively debate I have ever encountered in an un- 
dergraduate classroom, a debate about gender, race, and ethnicity that still 
echoes in my ears. 
When I listen rhetorically to the textual strategies associated with a 
h(ear)ing metaphor in this exchange, I hear echoes of multiple voices: I 
hear the young man's tone of authority and frustration along with an un- 
derlying defensiveness (he seemed to think he was expected to keep quiet 
about such ideas); I hear the cultural voice of a white America that imag- 
ines itself racially unmarked; I hear the silence of the classroom, of stu- 
dents not knowing whether and/or how to speak; and I also hear my 
teacherly tone, questioning yet subsuming the young man's thinking back 
into West's. Such listening creates a space in which it becomes possible to 
question the logos as it plays out in myself, in the students, and in our cul- 
ture. For example, would I have modelled a better listening technique if I 
had asked the class a less slanted question, such as "What happens when 
we lay this response alongside West's text?" And, how implicated am I in 
the fact that students felt they had few strategies for talking about gender 
and ethnicity, particularly whiteness? And, how often do I actually create 
pedagogical spaces that encourage such discussions? And, how frequently 
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am I just as dismissive of how my own racial markings complicate my be- 
havior, gendered or otherwise? And, why is white America so vested in 
being racially unmarked? Without this opportunity for listening, the 
young man and those who agreed with his ideas would never have been 
challenged, nor would have those students who whole-heartedly agreed 
with West, nor would have I. 
This young man reminded me of an important lesson: we learn by lis- 
tening to those who do not agree with us, provided the listening occurs in 
the context of "genuine conversation" (Copeland), where there is a desire 
in all parties to move our understanding forward. If the context is not one 
of genuine conversation, then refusing to listen may be appropriate. The 
trick is recognizing the differences as well as the possibilities for transform- 
ing the latter into the former. As a result of this young man's comments, I 
now try to see beyond my own reflection by listening to the discourses 
surrounding me in order to ask myself how being a white woman affects 
my being in the world. In this way, I try to bring bits of my own embodied 
sexism and racism to consciousness and become responsible for dealing 
with them one question at a time. 
Though valuable, autoethnography is admittedly limited in perspective. 
So to explore whiteness further, I decided to listen to academic research. 
Instead of reading to master the knowledge or to find a point of agreement 
and/or attack, I listened to studies of whiteness, laying them alongside my 
own lack of knowing. I wanted to understand how whiteness functions 
within our contemporary cultural matrix, specifically in the U.S., and how 
it is inscribed differently within all of us. The following are just a few ideas 
I uncovered. 
Like all cultural categories, whiteness is a trope, a category, a social con- 
struct that we employ to name people and practices. Yet a "conditional" 
relationship exists between white people and white practices in that not 
everyone can be classified as a white person but everyone can perform 
white practices, albeit with varying degrees of success (Keating 907). Al- 
though whiteness (like all cultural categories) is historically grounded 
(changing over time and space) and multiple (including lots of subcatego- 
ries), in the U.S. it has consistently signified "privilege"; as such, it has re- 
sisted and denied difference (Frankenberg, Social 236-37). While this 
privilege of whiteness has been translated into great achievements for 
some, it has also been translated into "dominance," even violence, for oth- 
ers. Functioning as a cultural norm (Hill 1; Dyer 2; Keating 904), whiteness 
and its privileges are often invisible to white people yet very visible to peo- 
ple of color. Although impossible to understand apart from its intersections 
with gender, class, sexual orientation, age, etc. (Thompson 94), whiteness 
is often a missing ground in our cultural conversations even as it appears 
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in census reports and college application forms. Perhaps AnnLouise Keating 
says it best: whiteness "-whatever it is, and I would argue that at this point 
no one really knows-" is slippery (916). 
When I listen rhetorically to this research, I also hear competing cultur- 
al logics: the status quo (which ignores whiteness) and the above critics 
(which promote whiteness studies). Further, I hear differences among the 
latter. I hear a tone of adamant authority in Frankenberg, an attempt to le- 
gitimize the study of whiteness within academic discourses by arguing that 
we must foreground this often invisible ground of our cultural discus- 
sions."3 I also hear a more tentative authority in Keating, a care taken with 
words such as "conditional" and "whatever it is" in recognition of both the 
values and dangers of studying whiteness. For despite the fact that white- 
ness studies has become a highly touted research area in literary studies, 
sociology, history, art, film studies, anthropology, etc., even proponents of 
whiteness studies voice concerns. Some feminist scholars question the 
study of whiteness, fearing it may be a politically conservative move in 
that it returns discussions once again to white people, especially white 
men, (Hill, "Introduction" 4-8), and some ethnicity scholars question such 
study, fearing as Michael Eric Dyson says, it may be "a sneaky form of 
narcissism... [that shifts] the focus and maybe even the resources back to 
white people and their perspectives (qtd. in Talbot 118). Others fear that 
studying whiteness risks reifying and perpetuating false categories of race 
(Keating 913). Listening to this research to question the logos invites me to 
consider the (im)possibilities of studying whiteness: it will not solve all 
discord; indeed, it may incite more. But it may also help us imagine bet- 
ter ways of articulating the political/ethical permutations of gender and 
ethnicity-and the ways they are rhetorically constructed and negotiated. 
Listening to this research also makes me aware of the strategic idealism 
underlying such a claim. 
By listening to autoethnography and academic research, I can test one 
against the other. But this juxtaposition also has its limits. Although both 
are useful means for understanding how gender and ethnicity merge in our 
culture, these means should not be used or taught unreflectively, nor 
should they be the only modes of critical thinking that we pass on to our 
students. For although autoethnography is becoming more common (just 
note the number of 1998 CCCC preconvention workshops on the topic), it 
risks lapsing into a narcissistic confessional solipsism-and a privileged one 
at thatl4-unless we tie the personal to the cultural in ways that expose 
how our experiences speak metonymically for larger cultural issues and 
unless we make such storytelling a viable option for all academicians, not 
simply a select few. Moreover, for those of us trained in the academy, schol- 
arly research too often resembles Tannen's definition of men listening: that 
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is, let's duel verbally or in writing so that I can prove how much I know 
and, hence, you'll respect me.15 
Consequently, we need to listen and offer students the opportunities to 
listen to the stories of others-all others. This realization echoes bell 
hooks' claim: "I have gone back to 'confession' not as a need to tell my 
own story in public or to be narcissistic, but because I now realize that 
people really learn from the sharing of experience" (Childers and hooks 
77). Such learning occurs not only when we listen to the claims in other 
people's stories but also when we listen to their cultural logics, or rather 
the competing cultural logics that such stories expose. 
To understand how whiteness is inscribed within white bodies,'6 we 
need to listen to stories such as Lillian Smith's reflections on her childhood 
in Killers of the Dream: 
The mother who taught me what I know of tenderness and love and com- 
passion taught me also the bleak rituals of keeping Negroes in their "place." 
The father who rebuked me for an air of superiority toward schoolmates 
from the mill and rounded out his rebuke by gravely reminding me that "all 
men are brothers," trained me in the steel-rigid decorums I must demand of 
every colored male. They who so gravely taught me to split my body from 
my mind and both from my "soul," taught me also to split my conscience 
from my acts and Christianity from southern tradition. (27) 
If I listen to the strategies in this text, I hear the contradictory sounds and 
rhythms in the first sentence: the mellifluous vowels in "tenderness and 
love and compassion" juxtaposed with the harsh consonants of "bleak rit- 
uals of keeping Negroes in their 'place.'" I also discern voices of competing 
cultural logics: the status quo vs. social activism. By teaching Smith to 
"split" the inscriptions of gender, class, sex, religion, regional tradition, 
that are interwoven within her young body, Smith's parents un/con- 
sciously perpetuate what Rich calls "white discourse" ("Distance" 182), 
wherein whiteness is a privileged norm split from other cultural categories 
in ways that render it invisible, hiding its violence behind parlor manners 
and polite language. By listening to question the logos, I have to ask myself 
if and how this version of white discourse is still being played out in my 
own life and culture, masked by middle class manners. 
To understand how whiteness is inscribed within non-white bodies but 
in ways that preclude these bodies from fully participating in the privileges 
of whiteness, we need to listen to stories like Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston's 
in Farewell to Manzanar. In her reflections on her family's life at Manzanar, 
a World War II Japanese-American internment camp, she remembers a 
story about her brother: 
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"[m]y oldest brother, Bill, led a dance band called The Jive Bombers.... He 
didn't sing Don't Fence Me In out of protest, as if trying quietly to mock the au- 
thorities. It just happened to be a hit song one year, and they all wanted to be 
an up-to-date American swing band.... 
Oh, give me land lots of land 
Under starry skies above, 
Don't fence me in. 
Let me ride through the wide 
Open country that I love (73-74) 
Listening to the textual strategies, I hear Wakatsuki Houston's disclaiming 
sisterly tone, denying any political intent on her brother's part; I also hear 
her more savvy writerly tone, using this "nonpolitical" incident to expose 
the political intent of white America as well its taken-for-granted privileg- 
es, like roaming. Though Bill desires to be non-political, his body is politi- 
cized, marked simultaneously by his Japanese ancestry and by his desire to 
be all-American. In the textual moment of Wakatsuki Houston's reflec- 
tions, I hear competing cultural logics of the Manzanar camp culture and 
the dominant white culture. From her perspective as a once wrongfully 
interned American citizen, she hears "Don't Fence Me In" very differently 
from how most white America heard it at the time of its release or from 
how most Americans hear it today in Embassy Suite commercials. For her, 
the role of the masculinized roamer rings falsely from the mouth of Bill, a 
young American imprisoned solely because his ancestry differed from the 
cultural norm.17 So while his desire to be all-American functions as a 
metonym for the white discourse of his time, the ancestry classifications 
within that white discourse preclude his full participation in the privileges 
of whiteness and, hence, the fulfillment of his desire. Indeed, within 1940s 
white culture, Bill's ethnicity trumps his gender even as his gender privi- 
leges him within the Manzanar camp. Listening to this passage in order to 
question the logos, I not only question the fairness and legality of Jeanne's 
and Bill's situations, but I also have to ask myself, once again, if and how I 
ever participate in white discourses in ways that might unknowingly erase 
the desires and material existence of others? 
A Pedagogical Instance, or Listening to a Student's Listening 
To illustrate how rhetorical listening plays out pedagogically, let me share 
an experience I had with a white student named Rachel Weber. For while 
Rachel was writing her second paper for our women's literature course, 
she put rhetorical listening into action as a trope for interpretive invention 
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and as a code of cross-cultural conduct. By listening to her listening, I was 
able to pull together the threads in my definition. During one class session 
we read aloud from Toni Morrison's Beloved, specifically the first telling of 
the shed scene where the escaped slave Sethe attempts to kill her children 
and herself before her former owner Schoolteacher can recapture them 
all. Narrated from four white men's points of view, this scene perfectly 
captures how white slaveholders justify slavery: they liken slaves to ani- 
mals and, consequently, deem beatings not inhumane, merely nonproduc- 
tive. After our class discussion, Rachel emailed me about a possible paper 
topic, one that would relate our class discussion to a guest lecture in her 
political science class, which she had attended earlier in the day. 
Hi! Something "strange" just occurred, and I was wondering if I could 
bounce it off you because the oddity of the situation just intrigues me, and I 
can't quite see how to put it into perspective, so I'm hoping you can help. 
(Quite a sentence!) First off, we just finished with class, and for you to un- 
derstand the story, you have to know that I have Dr. [X's] Corrections class 
right before yours. (I'm a Poli Sci and Crim major.) 
Okay, well today in that class, we had a guest speaker.... Now the man 
was entertaining and informative, and I enjoyed the class and his lecture im- 
mensely (one of those people who appear so energized you can't help but 
wonder how much coffee they drink in a single day--but still, they are fun 
to listen to as energy is infectious). Now to the point...He started his lecture 
by asking how many people believed in parole and whether it was a good 
thing or not. The class was overwhelmingly against it (typical), and the over- 
all opinion was that it was kind of a necessary evil (due to overcrowding, 
etc.). Well, to give us an example of one main reason parole and institutions 
like it were a necessity, he told a metaphor. The metaphor was one about a 
mean dog in the neighborhood who gets into trouble. If you chain the dog 
up and keep it on a short leash and punish it for it's [sic] wrongs, you are 
only causing the dog to become more angry. He compared this to prisoners 
who are kept in high security/maximum prisons. He then went on further to 
say that chaining someone/thing up for a long time and punishing it is only 
going to allow its hate and anger to grow, and that once the "dog" is let off 
the leash, it would be a mess to see what the reaction to society and the com- 
munity would be. Therefore, parole and institutions like it are necessary to 
reward those who attempt change and reformation, because if you just re- 
sort to a strict punishment approach, the "dogs" that are returned to the 
community will be beyond human reason and will only seek vengeance. 
Now if you haven't figured it out already, the reason I'm bringing this 
up is because it shares a striking similarity with the words that the school- 
teacher says to his nephew about breaking Sethe, as well as having a connec- 
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tion to the idea of people as animals. I'm sure this man that was speaking is 
a very nice guy, and maybe I'm just jumping onto this because the two class- 
es were juxtaposed right next to each other, allowing for the realization of 
the similar aspects to occur, but this just seems amazing to me. I was plan- 
ning to write my paper #2 on something entirely different, but now this just 
seems to be completely interesting. I suppose it would work into how slaves 
were treated as prisoners and how prisoners are in turn treated like animals 
(as slaves were also), but I just find this similarity too shocking to let it go. 
I'm wondering if you think there is a connection I could make and I guess 
how you think I could go about this. (The quote was on page 149 in Beloved 
is what I'm referring to.) If there is a weak connection in his metaphor, 
please just say so. I just am wondering if there is rather a distinctly definite 
one which ties into the fact that [the guest speaker] is white and that this 
chapter [in Beloved] was the only one written in the white perspective. I see 
why he used his metaphor, yet at the same time, I find it striking that he 
compared criminals to dogs and that schoolteacher compares slaves to ani- 
mals and both are referencing to treatment. Hmmmmmm.... Well, I just re- 
ally felt the need to get another person's perspective on this, and you 
definitely are the person with the most knowledge into what Beloved is 
"saying." 
So if you could help, I 'd appreciate it. Sorry that this explanation was 
so long-I didn't intend it to be! (I hope it all is clear too!) Anyways, thank 
you for thinking it over. 
Rachel sent me this email me, she later told me, because she had shared 
her idea with a good friend and he thought she was crazy, reading more 
into the situation than was really there. Was she?, she wanted to know. 
Her friend thought she was accusing the speaker of being a hypocrite. She 
was not, she assured me. She simply wanted to understand the discourses 
surrounding her. 
Coincidentally, Rachel emailed me a few days before I spoke about rhe- 
torical listening at UW-M. By listening to her listening, I not only heard but 
began to see possibilities for rhetorical listening. For Rachel, by laying the 
guest lecture and Beloved in front of her and letting them lie there, was at- 
tempting to invent topics and arguments for her second essay, hence rhe- 
torical listening as a trope for interpretive invention. And Rachel was 
proceeding with her project for a number of reasons. First, she wanted to 
understand the discourses surrounding her so that, when she graduated 
from college, she could act ethically as an employee within whatever sys- 
tem she found herself. Second, she wanted to avoid a guilt/blame logic. Her 
intent was not to nail the guest lecturer for hypocrisy; in fact, she went to 
great lengths in paragraph two to describe the guest speaker positively, 
218 CCC 51/December 1999 
even later calling him a "nice guy" in paragraph three. Her intent was to 
work within a responsibility logic, wherein she could question his dis- 
course and, albeit limitedly, participate in her own socialization. Third, she 
was intrigued by the commonalities and differences in the two discourses: 
both liken people to animals and justify behaviors on the grounds of pro- 
ductivity, yet Schoolteacher perpetuates a belief that some people are ani- 
mals while the guest lecturer resists this notion. Moreover, Rachel heard 
commonalities and differences in their cultural logics: both seem haunted 
by privileges of whiteness and gender even as Schoolteacher reinscribes an 
inhumane slave economy and the guest lecturer tries to reform the Wis- 
consin prison economy. 
Was Rachel's listening process as neat and orderly as the previous para- 
graph makes it appear? Of course not. You can tell that from listening to 
her email. She notes that something "'strange'" is haunting her, which she 
cannot pinpoint for herself. She is hesitant about her ideas so she waits 
until paragraph two to announce "Now to the point" although she follows 
that assertion with an ellipsis, which signifies a gap, an absence (of clarity? 
connection? confidence?). And although Rachel is quite articulate, sum- 
marizing the guest lecture and noting its possible connections to Beloved, 
she feels the need for someone else to put it into perspective; she has 
heard the commonalities and differences, but she cannot see the connec- 
tions clearly. The two discourses are lying before her, but she cannot con- 
nect them for herself in ways that make sense within her concept of the 
logos. Because part of my job as a teacher is to help students conceptualize 
their thinking processes in relation to larger cultural logics, I analyzed her 
e-mail for method and experienced the serendipitous pleasure of having 
my thinking about rhetorical listening clarified, which in turn enabled me 
to offer her a perspective on her topic. 
So what perspective did I offer Rachel? Did I think she was crazy? Obvi- 
ously not. I think she has a definite talent, not for "reading more into the sit- 
uation" as her friend had suggested but for listening to the exiled excess in 
our daily dialectical dialogues, for hearing what Morrison calls "the sound 
that [breaks] the back of words" (Beloved 261). And I think this talent was 
spurred, in part, by Rachel's literally hearing the two discourses side by side 
and then letting them lie before her, echoing in her ears. So I encouraged 
her to write the paper, even offering her some of my thoughts and readings. 
When I read her paper, I found her most interesting writing (at least in 
terms of my thinking about rhetorical listening and pedagogy) occurring 
in the final paragraph: 
It seems that white "rule-abiding" society could be suffering from fear. They 
could be worried that both criminals and blacks are inherently no different 
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than themselves, and with that as fact, how do they make themselves feel 
superior? If everyone is equal, they are the same, and if whites are the same 
as blacks and "rule-abiding" citizens are the same as criminals, how can we 
compare ourselves to an Other? How can we bolster the feeling of superiori- 
ty over the inferior groups of people who are just a bit behind us evolution- 
arily, if they are really not inferior or evolutionarily behind? The question is: 
why do we need to feel superior? What does this say about us? What have 
we become? 
Rachel's conclusion intrigues me on many levels. One is its pronoun us- 
age. In thinking through this cultural concern, Rachel has trouble with 
pronoun shifts, not in terms of grammatical agreement but in terms of 
who-is-what. Her category of "white rule-abiding society" is a they to her; 
yet because she is a white rule-abiding citizen herself, the category is also 
a we. But that implication is not yet articulated in Rachel's writing, perhaps 
because she does not see herself as being someone who needs to make 
others feel inferior. While she can listen to her guest lecturer and Toni 
Morrison, she seems not yet able to listen to her own text, at least not 
here, hence the importance of teaching rhetorical listening as a trope for 
interpretive invention that applies not just to the discourses of others but 
also to the discourses of one's self. A second level that intrigues me is her use 
of questions. She concludes with questions that we, as teachers, might tradi- 
tionally suggest should occur in her introduction as a frame for her paper, 
around which her paper would be developed. Although Rachel had initially 
desired to answer these questions in her paper, she could not, she told me 
when she handed in the paper, because the questions-especially as they re- 
lated to whiteness-were so new to her world view, hence the importance 
of teaching rhetorical listening as a code for cross cultural conduct. 
When I first listened to Rachel's email and paper, I was richly rewarded 
in that she helped me clarify my thinking about rhetorical listening. When 
I revisited her texts during the writing of this piece, I was challenged to be 
a better pedagogue. For what echoes in my ears is her email phrase: "he 
told a metaphor." It signifies both her awareness that language functions 
tropologically and also her assumption that tropes are something that can 
be told, added on for explanation or decoration. As a teacher, my chal- 
lenge is to reinforce in students the former idea and disabuse them of the 
latter. For understanding the tropologizing functions of language, not sim- 
ply as a manner of style but as the very "nature" of language itself, is one 
way of understanding how conflicting discourses can lie before us, rever- 
berating with the potential to be negotiated via rhetorical listening. As 
such, teaching rhetorical listening is one way of tackling the pronoun 
problem that haunts all our lives: how to see we in they and they in we. It is 
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also a way of emphasizing for students the importance of keeping ques- 
tions in play, maybe even using them as/in a conclusion. 
So Where Does That Leave Us? 
Defining rhetorical listening as a trope of interpretive invention not only 
emphasizes the discursive nature of rhetorical listening but also plays with 
the etymology of the term trope as "a turning." For rhetorical listening 
turns hearing (a reception process) into invention (a production process), 
thus complicating the reception/production opposition and inviting rhe- 
torical listening into the time-honored tradition of rhetorical invention.18 
Second, rhetorical listening turns the realm of hearing into a larger space, 
one encompassing all discursive forms, not just oral ones. Third, rhetorical 
listening turns intent back on the listener, focusing on listening with in- 
tent, not for it. Fourth, rhetorical listening turns the meaning of the text 
into something larger than itself, certainly larger than the intent of the 
speaker/writer, in that rhetorical listening locates a text as part of larger 
cultural logics. And fifth, rhetorical listening turns rhetoric's traditional fo- 
cus on the desires of speaker/writer into a harmonics and/or dissonance of 
the desires of both the speaker/writer and the listener. 
In sum, rhetorical listening broadens our possibilities for interpretive 
invention. When employed as a "code of cross-cultural conduct," rhetori- 
cal listening has the potential to generate more productive discourses 
about and across both commonalities and differences, whether these dis- 
courses be narratives or arguments, whether they be in academic journals 
or over the dinner table. As such, rhetorical listening responds to the need 
exemplified by Annie and Lora and promotes the possibility exemplified 
by Ruth and Naomi...and Rachel. 
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Notes 
1. By using the term interpretive invention, I 
hope to demonstrate the necessary iptersec- 
tions between interpretation, which is the 
dominant term for making meaning in philo- 
sophical hermeneutics, and invention, which 
is the dominant term for making meaning in 
rhetorical studies. 
2. In his foreword to Lunsford's Reclaiming 
Rhetorica, James Murphy claims that the au- 
thors of the essays "point to new places to 
look" for rhetorical history, theory, and prac- 
tice (xi). His claim reflects the dominant trend 
in our field of employing a sight metaphor. 
Lunsford's use of an auditory metaphor, lis- 
tening, supplements this trend. 
3. For a history of gender as an analytical 
category within academic scholarship and for 
a discussion of whether gender studies 
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should replace or supplement feminist stud- 
ies, see Showalter (1-13). Although I use the 
term race, I recognize that it is a highly con- 
tested term in that it is a trope for that which 
does not exist but which has become ideolog- 
ically "real" in U. S. culture. See Lerner for a 
history of the term's usage in the U. S. and 
for an excellent discussion of current think- 
ing about alternatives to its usage (184-98). 
Also see Dyson, who defines race as follows: 
"Race is not a card. It is a condition. It is a set 
of beliefs and behaviors shaped by culture, 
rooted in history, and fueled by passions that 
transcend reason" (42). 
4. Royster is not alone in calling for "codes 
of cross-cultural conduct." Michael Eric Dys- 
on argues that articulating such codes is nec- 
essary because "[w]e still don't know the 
rules of race" (8). But by "rules of race" Dys- 
on refers not just to codes of cross-cultural 
conduct but also to "the unwritten codes of 
conduct within black communities" (8). I 
agree with Dyson. I would argue further that 
we need to explore the unwritten codes of 
gender and ethnicity within other communi- 
ties as well and that we need to explore the 
functions of whiteness in every community. 
For too often the functions of whiteness are 
invisible in our culture; we rarely think of 
white as a "color" (as evidenced by the terms 
women of color and people ofcolor), and too of- 
ten the functions of whiteness create a dou- 
ble-bind in certain circles succeeding in 
school can be perceived as "acting white"). 
5. My assumption here is that because 
sexism and racism are structurally embedded 
in our culture and, hence, ourselves, they af- 
fect us all in our daily lives; consequently, we 
all have gender and race work to do if we are 
not unconsciously to replicate old patterns of 
thinking, being, and doing. 
6. Martin Jay provides a definition, histo- 
ry, and critique of "ocularcentrism" in order 
to argue for a hermeneutic revival of hearing 
via Wagner, Nietzsche, and Heidegger: "our 
increasing interest in the truths of interpreta- 
tion rather than the methods of observation 
bespeaks a renewed respect for the ear over 
the eye as the organ of greatest value (57). 
Other philosophers have set the stage for 
Jay's claims. Hegel locates hearing as an ide- 
al, arguing that hearing "does not belong to 
the sense of action [sens pratiques] but those 
of contemplation [sens th6oriques]; and is, in 
fact, still more ideal than sight" (qtd. in Derri- 
da 100). And Emmanuel Levinas, an anti- 
Hegelian who champions the ethical, not the 
ideal, also elevates sound over sight: "the 
glance by itself, contrary to what one may be 
led to believe, does not respect the other.... 
This is why Levinas places sound above light" 
(Derrida 99). 
7. I am indebted to Doug Day for calling 
this idea to my attention. 
8. Gordon Pradl pointed out in his review 
of this article that Louise Rosenblatt intro- 
duced a method of reading that closely re- 
sembles what I am calling listening in that 
her method also works to preserve the ideas 
of others within one's interpretation. 
9. Their cross-cultural listening may be 
further complicated by the animosity be- 
tween their cultures. Scholars disagree about 
the date of the book of Ruth, a disagreement 
that has implications for the degree of ani- 
mosity existing between the Judeans and the 
Moabites: As the New English Bible notes: 
Some scholars consider Ruth a postexilic lit- 
erary creation, though perhaps based on an 
older tale; on this view, it was intended to 
counteract the harsh decrees of Ezra and Ne- 
hemiah against foreign wives (Ezra 10. 1-5; 
Neh. 13. 23-27). Other scholars, however, 
date it much earlier, during the reigns of the 
first kings of Judah, before bitter enmity to- 
ward Moab had developed...." (277) 
10. For a brief history of the term under- 
standing in narrative studies from Brooks and 
Warren to the mid-1990's, see Phelan and 
Rabinowitz (5-11). For an accounting of the 
relationship between understanding and inter- 
pretation in classical hermeneutics, see Ble- 
icher (11-26) and Bruns (21-138). My use of 
standing under does not reflect the founda- 
tional meanings that KI(enneth Burke ascribes 
to John Locke's use of the Greek term hy- 
postasis, which means, "literally, a standing 
under": Hence anything set under, such as 
stand, base, bottom, prop, support, stay; 
hence metaphorically, that which lies at the 
bottom of a thing, as the groundwork, sub- 
ject-matter, argument of a narrative, speech, 
poem; a starting point, a beginning. And 
then come the metaphysical meanings...: 
Subsistence, reality, real being (as applied to 
mere appearance), nature, essence" (Grammar 
23). Standing under implies a place, a loca- 
tion, a standpoint for listening. 
11. In our current theoretical milieu, other 
is a loaded term. For example, in her feminist 
critique of Lacanian theory, Elizabeth Grosz 
describes the other/Other as follows: for Lacan, 
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the "other is the object through whom desire 
is returned to the subject; the Other is the lo- 
cus of signification which regulates the 
movement by which this return is made pos- 
sible" (80). In other words, "the Other is not 
a person but a place, the locus of law, lan- 
guage, and the symbolic" (67). As such, it "is 
understood here in two senses: as a socio- 
symbolic network regulated according to lan- 
guage-like rules; and as a psychical structure, 
representative of this social Other, internal- 
ized in the form of the unconscious" (117). 
As I use the term other, I am invoking Lacan's 
small "o" other, specifically as a person other 
than the listening subject or as the listening 
subject listening to itself. My goal for listen- 
ing is an intersubjectivity, not a continued 
subject/object relationship. 
12. For a discussion of how autobiography 
and ethnography may merge to create a 
strategy of autoethnography, see Watson, 
who argues that women may learn to articu- 
late their own stories if they learn to read 
their bodies as culturally inscribed texts; also 
see Clough and Deck. 
13. For other arguments on why white- 
ness needs to be articulated in our culture, 
see Fishkin, Davy, Dyson, Hill, Ignatiev, 
hooks ("Representations"), and Morrison 
(Playing). 
14. For excellent discussions of how au- 
thorization and privilege (or lack thereof) 
function in academic discourse and how 
their consequences play out, see Roof and 
Weigman's collection, which explores the 
question that is also their title: Who Can 
Speak? 
15. Marshall Gregory describes scholarly 
debate as warfare: "So much critical dis- 
course in the humanities-at least since the 
contemporary culture wars began about 
twenty years ago-is conducted in a 
scorched-earth, take-no-prisoners tone that 
at first irritates, then pains, and eventually 
numbs everyone's professional nerves, leav- 
ing the main combatants (and many of the 
rest of us as well) worn out with struggle and 
wondering if internecine warfare is really 
what we meant to sign up for when we en- 
thusiastically and jauntily set out for gradu- 
ate school years ago" (89). 
16. What constitutes a "white" body and a 
"non-white" body changes over time and 
place as demonstrated in Ignatiev's How the 
Irish Became White. 
17. Audre Lorde calls such a cultural norm 
a "mythical norm" and defines it as "white, 
thin, male, young, heterosexual, christian, 
and financially secure ("Age, Race" 116). 
18. Karen LeFevre cites four categories of 
invention: (1) a private apprehension of 
truth, based on Platonic theory; (2) an inter- 
nal dialogue of selves, based on Freudian 
theory; (3) a group of people's collaborative 
construction of truth, based on George Her- 
bert Mead's theory; and (4) a collective anal- 
ysis of how cultural codes socialize people's 
behaviors and attitudes, based on Imile 
Durkeim's theory (48-50). Like LeFevre's 
categories of collaborative and collective in- 
vention, rhetorical listening is concerned 
with how people construct meanings as well 
as with how cultural codes socialize people 
and how people both employ and change 
these codes to negotiate with one another. 
Like classical and neo-classical invention, 
rhetorical listening asks questions of texts; it 
also asks questions of the cultural logics 
within which these texts exist. Like postmod- 
ern invention, rhetorical listening searches 
for the gaps, the omissions, the unknowns, 
the contradictions, the questions not in order 
to reconcile them but in order to imagine 
where they may lead. Like a cultural studies 
invention, rhetorical listening also locates in- 
terpretation within particular moments and 
places to demonstrate how time and place af- 
fect interpretation. And given my particular 
interest, rhetorical listening may be em- 
ployed as a feminist invention process to ex- 
pose how gender intertwines with ethnicity 
and other cultural categories. 
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